

Balakireva O.M., PhD. in Sociology, Institute for Economics and Forecasting, Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences,

Bondar T.V., PhD. in Sociology, Ukrainian Institute for Social Research after Olexandr Yaremenko,

Dmytruk D.A., PhD. in Sociology, Social Monitoring Center

ELECTORAL ORIENTATION AND BEHAVIOR OF THE VOTERS DURING THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE ON 26 OCTOBER 2014¹

The article analyzes electoral behavior of the voters in the recent parliamentary elections, the electorate of the main political forces from the socio-demographic perspective. The article offers a comparative analysis of the results of exit polls conducted in the country on 26 October, 2014, and the official data of the Central Election Commission.

Keywords: *electoral orientations, electoral behavior, exit poll.*

Ukraine's Parliamentary elections of 2014 had a number of features related to the socio-political situation, which defined the agenda of the election rhetoric as well as the mobilization peculiarities in the formation of the population's political choice and the campaign character. A key distinguishing feature of the election campaign was timing, which was pre-term and very short as far as its organization is concerned. Consequently, it has affected many of its characteristics. The election was based on the old mixed system because the Law of Ukraine *On the Election of People's Deputies of Ukraine* was not changed, although the public was ready not only to change the members of the previous Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, but also to elect under the new electoral system: the public was being actively prepared for it, coalition insisted on it, the President was talking about it in his election program. The peculiarity of this election campaign was the fact that it took place almost immediately after the Presidential Elections in Ukraine. Another feature that distinguished the 2014 campaign from the 2012 election campaign was the fact that, according to most experts, administrative pressure was not have decisive in the election during the party voting (as opposed to the election of candidates in majority districts).

The short term of 2014 election campaign considerably intensified the processes of the mobilization of the supporters of some political parties and the decline in support for others. This election registered a record number of swing voters, whose number was sometimes higher than 2/3 of the active electorate. The public opinion on the majority constituency candidates for some single-member constituencies was even more hesitant. This is what determined the majority of the "high-speed" changes. Thus, *Narodniy Front* rankings soared at the last stage of the election campaign that pushed this political force to the first place and led to the electorate outflow and the decrease in support of *Petro Poroshenko's Bloc*. In the weeks preceding the election we saw the growth of the rating of

¹ *The article was created on the basis of the results of the exit poll (poll on election day), held on the day of elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, on October 26, 2014, and the pre-election national surveys on the electoral attitudes of different groups of voters.*

Samopomich and *Opposition Bloc* and the drop in support of *Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party*, *Batkivshyna* and *Svoboda Union*. All the stated changes have their objective reasons that will certainly become an interesting part of the Ukrainian political history. The dynamics of the electoral campaign orientations was presented in Issue № 1 of our magazine [1, pp. 119–147], and in this issue (see pp. 160–176).

This article focuses on the results of the poll on the Election Day, their comparison with the previous electoral intentions. The empirical base is constituted by the results of monitoring surveys of the population of Ukraine, conducted by the *Social Monitoring Center* and the *Ukrainian Institute for Social Studies named after Olexander Yaremenko* together with the *Department for Monitoring Studies of Socio-Economic Transformation of the Institute for Economics and Forecasting*, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine², and the voters' poll on the election day held by the *Social Monitoring Center* and the *Ukrainian Institute for Social Studies named after Olexander Yaremenko* ordered by the *National Information System Ltd.* titled *Exit Poll "Ukraine: 2014 Parliamentary Elections"*³.

Traditionally, the purpose of conducting exit polls is to ask respondents about their voting in elections for further analysis to select different categories and groups of citizens, for timely data acquisition to announce indicative results of voting on the election day immediately after the polls close. The target group of the study is constituted by the voters who went to the polls and at the time of the survey had already voted. Accordingly, general population of the study is constituted by the voters who voted at the polling stations located on the territory of Ukraine, with the exception of special sites (hospitals, military units, prisons, etc.), and a foreign constituency. Because of the anti-terrorist operation in Donetsk and Lugansk regions the work of interviewers in the region was complicated, so the sample at the polling stations where we interviewed was artificially high in order to preserve representativeness in case of emergencies during the election day. The sample is designed so as to obtain representative data for Ukraine as a whole, and for the six regions in particular (excluding the Autonomous Republic of Crimea). The proposed sampling design guarantees unbiased results and equal chances for each voter to be interviewed.

During the survey we used the method of "secret ballot": respondents were offered to fill the form on their own (vote imitation). The respondent by themselves pointed out which party they voted for and provided their social demographic characteristics (age, sex, social status, nationality, education level).

Previous experience of conducting exit polls during the parliamentary elections in 2012 [2] showed that, compared with direct questioning (the interviewer themselves asks

² The sample set for each poll monitoring is not less than 2,000 respondents, representative for the main socio-demographic characteristics with respect to the adult population of Ukraine. Last nationwide poll of the population was held from 5 to 15 December 2012 in 24 regions of Ukraine, Crimea and Kyiv. Total number of the surveyed respondents was 2,003. Standard deviations at 95% confidence level and a variable ratio of 0.1:0.9 to 0.5:0.5 constitute 1,34–2,24%. The method of obtaining information was personal interview at the residence of the respondent "eye to eye". The level of reachability of respondents was 50%.

³ The survey was conducted on October 26, 2014. 26,975 voters were interviewed in 419 polling stations, which guarantees a high level of statistical significance of the data. The level of reachability of respondents was 73.4%, the proportion of failures was 26.6%. The data obtained are representative at the national level with a statistical error not exceeding 2.2% for parties, leaders and 1.44% for the parties who have scored at least 10% of the vote.

the respondents) secret polling technique is more suitable for the voter, therefore, its application reduces the number of failures.

The levels of reachability of respondents in selected areas of the country are unevenly distributed. Thus, most actively the voters answered the question in Mykolaiv region (reachability level – 97,8%), Rivne region (86,8%), Ternopil region (84,9%) and Chernivtsi region (83,2%). The lowest level of reachability was registered in Zaporizha (56,8%), Odesa (59,3%), Donetsk (64,5%) and Poltava (65,2%) regions (Table 1).

Table 1

The level of reachability by regions, %

Administrative territories	Reachability level	Administrative territories	Reachability level
Vinnitsya Oblast	79,9	Mykolayiv Oblast	97,8
Volynsk Oblast	80,6	Poltava Oblast	65,2
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast	69,8	Rivno Oblast	86,8
Donetsk Oblast	64,5	Odesa Oblast	59,3
Zhytomyr Oblast	74,2	Sumy Oblast	77,4
Zakarpatska Oblast	77,4	Ternopil Oblast	84,9
Zaporizzha Oblast	56,8	Kharkiv Oblast	72,8
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast	76,5	Kherson Oblast	78,7
Kyiv Oblast	74,7	Khmilnytska Oblast	80,1
Kyiv	72,4	Cherkasy Oblast	78,1
Kyrovograd Oblast	73,1	Chernivtsi Oblast	83,2
Lugansk Oblast	67,6	Chernigiv Oblast	72,0
Lviv Oblast	77,9	Oblast mean value	73,4

Analyzing the level of reachability of the respondents in the regional context we can see that the most active voters cooperated with the interviewers in the West and South of Ukraine, and the least active were the ones in the East and the Donbas region (Table 2). This attitude may be explained not only by the general mood of the population in these regions, but also by separatism supporters intimidating the voters with the threat of violence. People cannot be sure of their own security in the future, that's why they try not to express their opinions openly, for fear that tomorrow this information can be used against them or their families.

Table 2

The level of reachability of respondents by region, %

Region	Reachability level
West of Ukraine	81,1
Center of Ukraine	75,3
North of Ukraine	74,6
East of Ukraine	64,5
Donbas region	66,1
South of Ukraine	78,6
Kyiv	72,4

Among all respondents 26.6% refused to participate in the survey. The main causes of failure were reluctance to talk at all (25,4% among those who refused), and lack of free time (25,1%). It should be noted that the overall level of trust to the sociologists remains high. Thus, about 3,5% of the respondents said they mistrusted sociological services.

Another part of the respondents (2,1%) was advised not to answer sociologists' questions, and 11,5% are afraid of their responses being made public (Table. 3).

Table 3

The main causes of respondents' refusal to participate in the survey, %

The respondent refused to talk at all	25,4
No free time	25,1
I voted, but do not want to answer, for whom I voted	15,0
I'm afraid of my response disclosure	11,5
I do not understand why there such surveys are conducted	7,5
I do not believe in the honesty of these elections	4,3
I do not trust sociologists	3,5
I was recommend not to answer sociologists' questions	2,1

In addition to a high level of trust to sociologists these elections are also characterized by a benevolent attitude towards the interviewers and their work: on the part of employees of precinct election commissions and observers, as well as on the part of the public and law enforcement agencies. So, most of all election commission employees (73%) and respondents themselves (52,2%) contributed to the work of sociologists. Neutral attitude to interviewers was often observed among the representatives of authorities (70,3%), law enforcement officials (60,5%) and observers (60,4%). During the interview, most of all election workers (1%) and observers (0,8%) hindered sociologists' work. The overall positive attitude of law enforcement officials should be noted specifically: 39% support the work of sociologists and no cases of hindrance to their activity were observed (Table 4).

Table 4

Attitude to interviewers at the polling stations, %

From:	Attitude:	%
Employees of the territorial election commissions (sites)	Provided assistance and facilitated the interviewers' work	73,7
	Neutral attitude	25,3
	Prevented, obstructed the interviewers' work	1,0
Law enforcement officials	Provided assistance and facilitated the interviewers' work	39,0
	Neutral attitude	60,5
	Prevented, obstructed the interviewers' work	0,5
Representatives of the state (local) authorities	Provided assistance and facilitated the interviewers' work	29,7
	Neutral attitude	70,3
	Prevented, obstructed the interviewers' work	0,0
Observers from candidates	Provided assistance and facilitated the interviewers' work	38,9
	Neutral attitude	60,4
	Prevented, obstructed the interviewers' work	0,8
The majority of respondents	Provided assistance and facilitated the interviewers' work	47,5
	Neutral attitude	52,2
	Prevented, obstructed the interviewers' work	0,3

The questionnaires also noted the time when they were filled out that allowed to determine not only peak hours of the electoral activity, but also to compare them with other available data.

The citizens demonstrated the highest level of activity in the parliamentary elections during the first half of the day. By midday 54% of respondents had already been interviewed. In the afternoon, voter turnout declined markedly. Thus, from 2 p.m. to 4 p.m. 29 per cent and from 5 p.m. to 8 p.m. 7 per cent were interviewed. Analyzing the sampling of respondents by age, it can be concluded that among the voters with increasing age the tendency to vote in the first half of the day becomes more pronounced. Thus, the youth aged 18 to 29 demonstrated the most even turnout throughout the day of elections, and on the contrary, the majority of respondents older than 60 preferred to go to the polls from 8 to 12 a.m. (Fig. 1).




Fig. 1. Sample filling by the survey hour, percentage among the respondents by age

Characteristic features on this indicator are largely similar to the respondents of regional centers and towns as well as rural areas. Most respondents in all types of localities expressed a desire to go to the polls till noon.

In the morning, the largest electoral activity of citizens was observed from 10 a.m. to noon. It was sufficiently high in the period from 2 p.m. to 4 p.m., and then gradually decreased, remaining stable in the interval between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m.




Fig. 2. Sample filling by the survey hour, among all respondents, *number of people*

Analyzing the filling of the sample by the time of the survey in different types of localities, one can observe certain patterns:

- Urban residents show lower electoral activity during the opening of polling stations than the inhabitants of villages and regional centers.
- Residents of regional centers vote less in the evening, around 7–8 p.m., than people in other types of localities.
- The electoral activity of citizens remains stable during the period from 10 a.m. to noon, from 2 p.m. to 3 p.m. and from 5 to 6 p.m. in all types of localities.

Comparison of the results of the exit poll Ukraine: 2014 Parliamentary Elections with the official data of elections (CEC) and the results of other exit polls.

The underestimation of the ranking of the race leader *Narodniy Front* was a characteristic feature of all exit polls. Thus, the minimum deviation from the real result of political power was 0,34%. Conversely, all sociological services, whose results were analyzed during the exit polls, showed overestimation of *Petro Poroshenko's Bloc* rating. Minimal deviation of the survey results from the final data of the CEC was 0,33%, and the maximum was 2,48%.

A comparative analysis of exit polls conducted on the day of elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine showed that according to the sum of the absolute deviations the closest to the official results of the exit poll proved to be the result of *UISR/SMC*. At the same time, the poll conducted by *R&B Group* was the closest to the actual results of the election race on specific political forces. Both sociological centers conducted a survey at approximately the same (about 400) number of polling stations and were able to predict the results of *Petro Poroshenko's Bloc*, *Samopomich Union*, *Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party (R&B group)* and *Opposition Bloc (UISR/SMC)* most accurately. The result of the final

leader of the parliamentary races *Narodniy Front* (by the party lists) was most accurately predicted by the *Rating Group*. It also turned out to be the best in predicting the share of the support for the *Batkivshyna Union* by the citizens.

As for the outsiders of 2014 Parliamentary Elections, their final results were closest to the polls conducted by *R&B Group* (*Svoboda Union* and the *Communist Party of Ukraine*), *UISR/SMC* (*Strong Ukraine*) and the sociological service *Savik Shuster Studio* (*Civic Stance*). A characteristic feature of all the exit polls was the prediction of *Svoboda Union's* "passing score" to the Parliament (overcoming the 5 percent barrier). However, the final results of CEC calculations showed that this political force did not score enough to get to the Parliament (Fig. 3, Table 5).




Fig. 3. The distribution of parliamentary seats among party-winners in multi-mandate constituency (CEC data)

Table 5

Comparison of the results of the exit poll Ukraine: 2014 Parliamentary Elections with the official data of elections (CEC) and the results of other exit polls

	CEC	The Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, KIIS, Razumkov Cetner	deviations	Rating, Baltic Surveys / The Gallup Organization, IRI	deviations	TNS	deviations	R&B group	deviations	UISR/SMC	deviations	Savik Shuster Studio	deviations
Narodniy Front	22,14%	21,2%	0,94%	21,8%	0,34%	21,8%	0,34%	18,23%	3,91%	19,5%	2,64%	20,7%	1,44%
Petro Poroshenko's Bloc	21,82%	23,1%	-1,28%	22,2%	-0,38%	24,3%	-2,48%	22,15%	-0,33%	23%	-1,18%	23,2%	-1,38%
Samopomich Union	10,97%	13,4%	-2,43%	14,2%	-3,23%	12,5%	-1,53%	10,86%	0,11%	11,7%	-0,73%	13%	-2,03%
Opposition Bloc	9,43%	7,6%	1,83%	7,8%	1,63%	6,6%	2,83%	11,12%	-1,69%	9,9%	-0,47%	8%	1,43%
Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party	7,44%	6,4%	1,04%	6,4%	1,04%	7,1%	0,34%	7,32%	0,12%	6,6%	0,84%	6,8%	0,64%
Batkivshyna Union	5,68%	5,5%	0,18%	5,6%	0,08%	6%	-0,32%	6,06%	-0,38%	5,5%	0,18%	5,5%	0,18%
Absolute deviations			7,7%		6,7%		7,84%		6,54%		6,04%		7,1%

sum by 6 parties													
Svoboda Union	4,71%	6,3%	-1,59%	5,8%	-1,09%	6,3%	-1,59%	5,51%	-0,8%	5,8%	-1,09%	5,8%	-1,09%
Absolute deviations sum by 7 parties			9,29%		7,79%		9,43%		7,34%		7,13%		8,19%
Communist Party of Ukraine	3,88%	2,8%	1,08%	2,9%	-0,98%	2,6%	1,28%	4,05%	-0,17%	3,3%	0,58%	2,9%	0,98%
Strong Ukraine	3,11%	2,6%	0,51%	2,7%	0,41%	2,4%	0,71%	3,84%	-0,73%	3%	0,11%	2,8%	0,31%
Civic Stance	3,1%	3,5%	-0,4%	3,2%	-0,1%	3%	0,1%	3,07%	0,03%	3,3%	-0,2%	3,1%	0
Absolute deviations sum by 10 parties			11,28%		9,28%		11,52%		8,27%		8,02%		9,48%
Relative accuracy rating (the lowest index of absolute deviations sum)			5		3		6		2		1		4

Thus, the resulting table shows that exit polls most accurately predicted the distribution of seats for *Petro Poroshenko's Bloc*, *Opposition Bloc*, *Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party* and *Batkivshyna Union*. The data concerning these political forces differ from the data obtained by the CEC by 2-3 mandates. However, the actual results of *Samopomich Union* were lower than predicted (the difference from the average value is by 4 mandates). We should also mention the factor of *Svoboda Union*. According to the exit polls, *Svoboda Union* is approximately on par with *Batkivshyna*. But, as noted above, this political force has not overcome the 5-percent barrier and could not become a member of the Parliament.

The turnout

The peculiarity of exit polls is that they, unlike actual voting, give the possibility to produce a socio-demographic profile of the voter, using the data that respondents provided independently when filling out the questionnaire. Referring to the data obtained in the survey, the information on the number of resident population and the turnout (CEC), it can be calculated, which groups were most active during the vote and came to the polls.

As in 2014 parliamentary elections, young people aged 18 to 29 (34,25%) showed the lowest electoral activity, while the representatives of the age group from 50 to 59 demonstrated the highest electoral activity (49,11%) (see Table 6).

Table 6

Turnout indices modeling for different age groups based on the result of exit poll, data on the number of voters (CEC)

Age groups	Exit poll data (%)	Relative (calculated) number of voters (52,99% turnout, 15,963,543 of the voters according to the CEC)	Relative (calculated) number of residents as of 1 January, 2014 voters (37,236,028 persons according to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine)	Calculated turnout based on exit poll results (%)
18–29	16,8%	2 681 875	7 829 355	34,25%
30–39	17,6%	2 809 583	6 890 792	40,77%

40–49	17,7%	2 825 547	6 131 333	46,08%
50–59	20,4%	3 256 562	6 631 256	49,11%
60+	25,1%	4 006 849	9 753 292	41,12%

Electoral likings dynamics

Comparing the results of the exit poll conducted by the *Social Monitoring Center* and the *Ukrainian Institute for Social Research named after Olexander Yaremenko* by request of *National Information Systems Ltd.* on the election day with the two results conducted in October 2014 (from October 4 to 10 and from October 17 to 22) (Table 7) we can observe a number of tendencies characterizing the latest parliamentary race.

The total support of the parties, which are the members of the current coalition, remained the stable during the month (68%, 69%, 67%). However, we can observe significant changes of the electoral orientations within the coalition during October: simultaneous rise of the *Narodniy Front* and *Samopomich* ratings alongside with the fall in the support of *Petro Poroshenko's Bloc* and *Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party*. At the same time the support of *Batkivshyna Union* is stable and this political party is on the verge of overcoming the 5-percent barrier along with *Svoboda Union*.

Moreover, the number of the people who want to vote for the *Opposition Bloc* was going up steadily during the last month (6,5%, 8,2%, 9,9%).

The absence of an obvious elections favorite, general instability of the political situation and people's wish to see new faces in the highest legislative body significantly influenced the accuracy of the surveys.

The accuracy of pre-election polls on the level of electoral support of the final winners – *Narodniy Front* and *Petro Poroshenko's Bloc* – turned out to be insignificant. Yet, thanks to the surveys we were able to clearly trace the tendencies of the changes in the rankings of these political forces.

Table 7

The dynamics of the voters' electoral preferences in October 2014 (%)

Political force	Survey data October 4–10	Survey data October 17–22	Exit poll data on the elections day October 26	CEC final data
Narodniy Front	9,1%	13,9%	19,5%	22,14%
Petro Poroshenko's Bloc	35,1%	27,2%	23,0%	21,82%
Samopomich Union	5,5%	7,2%	11,7%	10,97%
Opposition Bloc	6,5%	8,2%	9,9%	9,43%
Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party	11,3%	12,5%	6,6%	7,44%
Batkivshyna Union	6,6%	8,2%	5,5%	5,68%
Svoboda Union	6,3%	4,9%	5,8%	4,71%

One can account for these tendencies by the fact that in a week preceding the elections a considerable amount of the respondents didn't have concrete electoral preferences. Thus, 44,6% of the respondents were indecisive about which party from the current coalition they were going to vote for. The sharp swing in preferences of this share of the citizens in the last week is the result of high activity in the pre-election campaign by political parties and blocs. Based on the list of possible recipient parties, changes in the

level of electoral support seem quite logical: the number of *Narodniy Front* supporters was steadily increasing during the last month; *Samopomich Union* received part of the electorate along with *Petro Poroshenko's Bloc* and *Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party*. It should be noted that along with no firm confidence in the electorate's preferences in terms of individual parties there were practically no "swings" of the electorate between the current coalition and the *Opposition bloc* (Table 8).

Table 8

The level of the electorate's "confidence" in voting for the main political forces

Political force	Количество уверенных, Что будут голосовать за нее (%)	Возможные партии-реципиенты (от наибольшей к наименьшей)
«Narodniy Front»	53%	Petro Poroshenko's Bloc, Samopomich Union
Petro Poroshenko's Bloc	53%	Narodniy Front, Samopomich Union
Samopomich Union	63%	Petro Poroshenko's Bloc, Narodniy Front
Opposition Bloc	60%	Strong Ukraine, CPU
Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party	51%	Narodniy Front, Petro Poroshenko's Bloc
Batkivshyna Union	43%	Narodniy Front, Petro Poroshenko's Bloc
Svoboda Union	50%	Petro Poroshenko's Bloc, Narodniy Front

The electorate of the major parties on the basis of sex

Analyzing the electorate of the political forces participating in the Parliamentary elections of 2014, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the political preferences of some socio-demographic strata of the population according to the exit poll data.

Thus, among all respondents, women make up a large part – 53,9% of women versus 46,1% of men. In addition, women constitute the majority of the voting for parties that are the leaders of the parliamentary races (60,5% – *Narodniy Front*, 53,8% – *Petro Poroshenko's Bloc*, 52,1% – *Samopomich Union*, 56,6% – *Batkivshyna Union*). At the same time, women constitute the majority of the electorate of the *Opposition Bloc* (59,1%), *Strong Ukraine* (54%). This ratio can be explained by the more peaceful mood of female voters in general and their having a tendency to vote for moderate political forces.

At the same time, the reverse trend is observed whereas the male half of the voters is concerned. They dominate in the electorate's structure of *Svoboda Union* (54,8%), the *Communist Party* (51,9%), *Civic Stance* (53,9%), *Praviy Sector* (59,7%). Men are more focused on the radical political forces whose programs are based on the plans to take decisive action directed at the economy, the social sphere and, as is typical of the 2014 Parliamentary elections, military actions and the army. All the parties, whose voters were predominantly men, except the *Communist Party*, in one way or another linked their campaign rhetoric with the need to continue the active phase of the anti-terrorist operation in Donbas region and solve the problem of separatism by military means. It fully meets the more militant nature of the male share of the population, and such calls surely caught on, which is confirmed by the survey data.

As for the *CPU*, the gender division of the electorate is not as significant as age division. Moreover, it should be noted that in terms of age structure, the citizens over 60 constitute 53% of the voters for this political power. Such data can be explained by the older generation's nostalgic mood peculiar equally to men and women. Similar division

(50,5% men and 49,5% women) was also observed among the voters for *Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party*. However, one could note the influence of a charismatic leader of the party here, who attracts both men and women (Fig. 4).




Fig. 4. The division of the electorate of the parties that received the support of more than 2% of the voters, by gender

The electorate of the major parties by age groups

Young people typically perceive simpler forms of political appeals better than complex electoral initiatives. That's why a significant share of youth regarded radical political forces – *Praviy Sector* (32%) and *Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party* (22%) – with favor. Interestingly, people aged over 60 (28%) also actively voted for the latter. This could be explained by the personal charisma of the party leader Oleh Lyashko, appealing to the older generation, and radical ideas that are traditionally popular with young people. *Samopomich Union* could be seen as an exception because a significant share (24%) in the structure of its electorate are people aged from 18 to 29. This can be explained by the fact that the political force's activities and political platform reflects the mood of the young intelligentsia, positioning itself as a new "fresh" wave of politicians, expected and desired in the Ukrainian society in general, and by the youth in particular. This is indicated by the fact that the electorate of *Samopomich Union* is largely dominated by people with honor degree.

The request for new politicians among young people is also reflected in the voting for the little known political forces which weren't involved in the big-scale election campaign. Thus, the share of voters aged from 18 to 29 is 27% of their electorate. These

results may be explained not only by the voting for new political ideas and forces, but also to the counter-voting based on the young people's disillusionment in politics after the *Revolution of Dignity*. Unwillingness to vote for parties that do not implement reforms and do not have a clear policy together with the post-revolutionary wave of civic consciousness is manifested in counter-voting.

The older generation shows different electoral trends. A significant part of those aged over 60 voted for the *Communist Party of Ukraine* and the *Opposition Bloc*. This can be explained by the nostalgic mood among the elderly, as well as by the influence of the campaign held by the *Opposition Bloc*, which largely focused on the social sector, which is important for this part of the electorate. Also, elderly people are inclined to vote for the party leaders (25% voted for *Narodniy Front* and 26% voted for *Petro Poroshenko's Bloc*) and other well-known political forces. The desire for stability, which is increasingly seen in people with age, was also reflected by the results of the survey: the general trend indicates that with the respondents' increasing age their commitment to the well-known political forces increases as well, and the youth, on the contrary, is ready to vote for new politicians. Citizens aged 50 to 59 predominantly voted for well-known political forces; this part of the electorate is evenly distributed among all the participants of the campaign. It should be pointed out that this population category most actively voted for *ZASTUP Union* and least actively, as compared to other age groups, tended to choose less-known parties (15% of those who voted for "Other") (Fig. 5).




Fig. 5. Distribution of the electorate of the major parties by the respondents' age

The electorate of the major parties by the educational status

Among all the respondents the proportion of people with honor degree is the highest – 39%. Also, a significant portion of respondents have complete secondary-level education

(31%). The educational level of the respondents corresponds to the general ratio of the level of education in the Ukrainian society and is representative for the entire electorate. An interesting fact is that people with honor degree constitute the majority of those who vote for more radical parties. Thus, in the structure of those who voted for *Svoboda Union* the share of the voters with honor degree constitute 44%, those who voted for *Praviy Sector* – 49%, and those who voted for *Civic Stance* – 48%. This suggests that educated citizens want to see changes in the political system and believe that these changes should be made from the center-right ideological positions. It can also be confirmed by the fact that active respondents with honor degree voted for *Samopomich Union*, which, despite not being a radical political party, presents itself as a new force in the Parliament. At the same time this category of citizens consistently votes for parties and blocs of the present coalition (*Narodniy Front* – 36%, *Petro Poroshenko's Bloc* – 39%, *Batkivshyna Union* – 37%). An exception is *Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party* (21%) – purely leadership party, whose leader has positioned himself as a man of the people and actively uses expressions that are typical for rural residents and workers. He attracted less attention of educated citizens and, on the contrary, received considerable support from people with complete secondary education (42%).

Respondents with secondary education in general reproduce tendencies characteristic also for the people with higher education, but their choice is mainly based on the famous parties with more moderate political views. Active voting of this category of the electorate for *ZASTUP Union* (36%) can be attributed to the political platform of this political force, which is based mainly on the peasantry – mostly people without higher education.

Also, respondents with honor degree actively voted for the *Opposition Bloc* and the *Communist Party of Ukraine* (35% and 33% respectively). Such voting can be attributed not only to age characteristics, but also to pro-Russian value orientations – it should be noted that the majority of those who voted for these political forces reside in the East and South of the country, as well as in Donbas region and are stable electorate of both the *Communist Party*, and the *Opposition Bloc*, which is a modern reincarnation of the *Party of Regions* (Fig. 6).




Fig. 6. Distribution of the electorate of the major parties by education level

As for the citizens with basic higher education, their choices are almost evenly distributed among both the favorites of the campaign, and the outsiders of the election races. Respondents with basic secondary education are more inclined to choose well-known political forces and pro-Russian parties, as well as *Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party*, whose calls are clear and acceptable for this part of the population.

The electorate of the major parties by the social status

Analyzing the distribution of the electorate for the major political forces, we can see that a significant part of them consists of working people, their share amounts to 53% of all the respondents. Also, a significant proportion (28%) is constituted by senior citizens. Employed voters uniformly voted for all the political forces, the average value of voting for the representatives of the current coalition among the employed voters amounted to 54% of all the respondents. A significant proportion (45%) voted for the *Opposition Bloc*. In general, the distribution of the votes of the employed population meets other electoral trends given above. The only fact worth mentioning is that their share in the structure of the electorate of the *Communist Party of Ukraine* is the lowest – 31%, however, senior citizens actively vote for this political force (54%). This corresponds to the stable associations of the elderly, who connect the communist regime with guarantees of social protection, and vice versa, employed people associate this political system with low salaries and lack of opportunities for significant career advancement.

Students' votes were evenly distributed among all political forces, but they most actively supported radical parties with charismatic leaders and simple campaign rhetoric – *Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party* and *Praviy Sector* (Fig. 7).




Fig. 7. Distribution of the electorate of the major parties by the social status

The electorate of the major parties by self-determination with respect to nationality

The vast majority of the voters describe themselves as ethnic Ukrainians (93% of all respondents). The second largest group are Russians (5%). Despite the even distribution of Ukrainian and Russian voters for all political forces, it is necessary to note that there is a trend that Ukrainians vote less and Russians vote more for the *Opposition Bloc*, the *Communist Party* and *Strong Ukraine*. These indicators characterize the foreign policy vectors for these political forces. As is known, the *Opposition Bloc* and the *Communist Party of Ukraine* are more prone to pro-Russian policy, and the leader of the *Strong Ukraine*, Sergiy Tigipko, in his turn, formed the image of "a new pro-Russian political force" in the citizens' minds, which also received the support of the Russians due to its foreign policy orientation (Fig. 8).




Fig. 8. The division of the electorate of the parties that received the support of more than 2% of the voters, by nationality

The electorate of the main parties in the context of different types of localities

Regional distribution of the voting presents these trends: the pro-Russian political forces (*Opposition Bloc*, the *Communist Party of Ukraine*, *Strong Ukraine*) receive the most votes in the East of Ukraine and Donbas region, where the majority of the traditional electorate of these parties resides. Leading political forces of the new Parliament (*Narodniy Front*, *Samopomich Union*, *Petro Poroshenko's Bloc*) were supported by the population of Western Ukraine, mainly due to the pro-European course declared by these parties. At the same time, other members of the current coalition – *Batkivshyna Union* and *Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party* – were supported in the North and Center of Ukraine (Table 9).

Table 9

The level of the support of political forces in the regional context,%	Regions							Ukraine
	West	Center	North	East	Donbas region	South	Kyiv	
1. Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party	5,43	8,88	9,47	6,61	4,52	5,26	4,18	6,6
2. Solidarity of Women of Ukraine	0,3	0,74	0,84	0,94	1,26	0,74	0,18	0,6
3. Internet Party of Ukraine	0,22	0,11	0,21	0,89	0,52	1,03	0,54	0,5
4. Opposition Bloc	0,99	2,89	2,22	21,29	35,58	13,48	2,45	9,9
5. Narodniy Front	30	21,41	22,24	11,21	8,38	14,51	14,95	19,5
6. 5.10	0,24	0,65	0,48	1,02	0,44	0,58	1,15	0,6
7. ZASTUP Union	1,6	2,38	2,85	2,55	0,3	2,26	0,76	1,9
8. Vidrozhennya	0,12	0,13	0,12	0,34	0	0,16	0	0,2
9. New Policy	0,06	0,18	0,12	0,19	0,07	0,25	0,04	0,1
10. Edyna Strana	0,18	0,34	0,21	0,22	0,22	0,25	0,43	0,3
11. People's Power	0,21	0,07	0,21	0,17	0,07	0,21	0,07	0,2
12. Svoboda Union	6,99	6,05	6,82	3,37	2,82	3,29	10,01	5,8
13. National Democratic Party of Ukraine	0,06	0,18	0,09	0,12	0,52	0,29	0,29	0,2
14. Communist Party of Ukraine	0,36	2,31	1,32	6,2	8,08	7,11	2,52	3,3
15. Samopomich Union	16,21	10,76	12,89	9,69	5,19	10,28	19,49	11,7
16. Ukraine is an Indivisible Country Union	0,09	0,34	0,12	0,31	0,37	0,37	1,08	0,3
17. Praviy Sector	3,32	2,56	2,13	2,08	1,85	2,14	3,39	2,5
18. Ukraine of the Future	0,07	0,18	0,15	0,12	0,22	0,16	0,11	0,1
19. Liberal Party of Ukraine	0,01	0	0,06	0,03	0	0,12	0,14	0,0
20. Green Party of Ukraine	0,19	0,2	0,36	0,37	0,59	0,33	0,11	0,3
21. Ukrainian Party Green Planet	0,1	0,45	0,12	0,54	0,15	0,37	0,18	0,3
22. Petro Poroshenko's Bloc	22,95	28	25,51	18,84	17,57	22,11	23,78	23,0
23. Strength and Dignity	0,03	0,16	0,12	0,34	0,07	0,04	0,04	0,1
24. Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists	0,13	0,16	0,12	0,05	0,15	0	0,36	0,1
25. Sregiy Tigipko's Party <i>Strong Ukraine</i>	1,47	1,82	1,92	4,51	6,6	7,27	1,98	3,0
26. Batkivshyna Union	4,66	5,85	6,55	4,56	2,59	4,23	6,74	5,5
27. Civic Stance	3,86	2,94	2,64	3,13	1,78	2,63	4,79	3,3
28. Bloc of the Left Forces of Ukraine	0,09	0,2	0,06	0,09	0	0,33	0,18	0,1
29. Civic Movement of Ukraine	0,07	0,07	0,03	0,22	0,07	0,21	0,07	0,1

The Distribution of the level of electoral support by types of localities demonstrates that *Petro Poroshenko's Bloc* is more supported in rural areas, where the party's main competitor is *Narodniy Front*. A significant advantage of the latter is clearly visible among the electorate living in towns with populations ranging from 50 to 100 thousand inhabitants. The highest level of support in big cities was gained by the *Opposition Bloc*, whereas in the regional centers *Samopomich Union* has the largest electorate (Table 10).

Table 10

The level of support of political forces, by the locality type, %

	Oblast Center	City, 100-999 thousand inhabitants	City, 50-99 thousand inhabitants	City, 20-49 thousand inhabitants	Town, less than 20 inhabitants	Urban-type locality	Village
Petro Poroshenko's Bloc	22,1	19,1	19,6	24,7	24,4	26,2	24,4
Narodniy Front	17,4	12,8	24,7	20,0	25,9	18,1	21,5
Samopomich Union	16,8	10,3	16,3	12,2	12,2	9,0	9,2
Opposition Bloc	8,6	24,4	6,5	8,7	5,4	11,1	5,9
Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party	4,6	6,1	5,1	7,1	6,7	7,1	10,0
Svoboda Union	6,8	3,6	7,5	6,4	5,6	4,1	5,1
Batkivshyna Union	5,2	4,0	4,5	5,9	5,3	5,7	5,0
Civic Stance	4,1	2,6	3,2	3,8	2,6	2,7	2,9
Communist Party of Ukraine	3,2	5,3	3,2	2,5	1,9	3,7	2,8
Sregiy Tigipko's Party <i>Strong Ukraine</i>	2,7	3,9	2,6	2,3	2,0	3,7	3,5
Praviy Sector	3,6	2,4	3,0	2,4	2,5	1,3	1,8
ZASTUP Union	0,9	1,7	0,9	1,7	2,4	3,4	3,4

It should be noted that the Election Day survey data (exit poll) really give the ability to quickly see and publicly discuss the preliminary results of elections. At the same time, the role of exit polls as control technology should not be overestimated. The role of the exit poll in the electoral process is not limited to the fact that the community can have rough results of the voting quickly. The data obtained during exit polls provide a unique analytical information on the electoral behavior of different population groups, allow to analyze how a "flow" of voting on election day is formed, the peculiarities of the actual electorate of certain political forces.

During the latest parliamentary elections in Ukraine several exit polls at the national level and a number of exit polls at the level of individual majority districts were conducted. Like after the previous exit poll, we again focus on the expediency and usefulness of combining existing data array not only for comparative analysis, but also for a deeper analysis of the actual electoral behavior of the Ukrainians. From the methodical perspective it seems advisable to hold scientific debate about the differences of the exit poll results when applying different methods during data collection.

Today the studies of electoral space in Ukraine have accumulated a lot of empirical data, but not enough theoretical and methodological awareness of the electoral space, comparison of the data obtained by different sociological companies, not to compare the ratings, but to find the factors influencing the existing differences [3]. It is of importance to study "untruthful answers" factor of the respondents prone to giving socially approved or socially expected answers to the questions: "Which political party are you going to vote for?" [4; 5; 6].

The process of exit poll conducting also has a number of technical problems, in particular, the ways to ensure random selection of polling stations, the refusal of potential respondents to participate, the need for a break in the work of the interviewers, the observance of a certain sampling spacing (especially in the areas with a large number of voters and at times when the intensity of the voters' flow is high). As mentioned above, the insincerity of the responses, socially expected responses when the voters take into account the overall political field in the area where the site is located, is still a big problem. As a result, researchers get inflated rates of pro-government political forces in the regions and areas where they have their main support [7; 8; 9].

According to the results of the Parliamentary Elections of Ukraine from party lists in 2014 a number of conclusions could be made. Lower voter turnout to the election precincts, despite the predictions and high verbal intentions during the pre-election polls, indicates a "crisis of confidence" in Ukrainian society. Short-termed election campaign resulted in the phenomenon that the majority of voters made up their minds which political party they were going to vote for in the last week preceding the elections or at the polls. The presence of six political forces in the Parliament, four of which are new, shows that the formation and structuring of the political field remains a burning issue for Ukraine. The topicality is enhanced by the preservation of the mixed system of the election of MPs, indicating the immaturity of political forces, and consequently causing the diminution in the "controllability" of the Parliament. The current structure of the Parliament also means that it will be "dynamic", active, restless...

References

1. Balakireva O.M., Dmytruk D.A. *Suspil'no-politychni nastroi naseleennya Ukrainy: otsinky potochnoi sytuatsii, riven' doviry, elektoral'ni orientatsii ta pokaznyky gromads'koi aktyvnosti: berezen' 2014 r.* [The population of Ukraine: assessment of current situation, the level of trust, electoral orientations and social activity: March of 2014]. *Ukrains'kyi sotsium – Ukrainian society*, 2014, No. 1, pp. 119–147 [in Ukrainian]
2. Balakireva O.M., Bondar T.V., Dmytruk D.A. *Elektoral'ni orientatsii ta povedinka vybortsiv pid chas vyboriv narodnykh deputativ Ukrainy 28 zhovtnya 2012 roku* [Electoral orientations and voters' behavior during the elections of people's deputies of Ukraine, October 28, 2012] *Ukrains'kyi sotsium – Ukrainian society*, 2012, No. 4, pp. 213–238 [in Ukrainian]
3. Akhremenko A.S. *Elektoral'noe prostranstvo: teoretiko-metodologicheskie problemy: dis. ... d-ra polit. nauk: 23.00.01* [Electoral space: theoretical and methodological problems : dis. ... Dr. polit. sciences : 23.00. 01]. Moscow, 2009, 430 p., available at: <http://www.dissercat.com/content/elektoralnoe-prostranstvo-teoretiko-metodologicheskie-problemy#ixzz2H5jO4NEC> [in Ukrainian]
4. Kalinin K. *Kak issledovat' elektoral'nye fal'sifikatsii?* [How to investigate electoral fraud?]. *TrV "Vybory"*, 2012, No. 99, 13 of March, pp. 6–7, available at: <http://trv-science.ru/2012/03/13/kak-issledovat-ehlektoralnye-falsifikatsii/> [in Russian]
5. *Elektoral'nye sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, pod red. D.G. Rotmana* [Electoral sociological research, ed. by D. G. Rothman]. Kemerovo, Kuzbassvuzizdat, 2002 [in Russian]
6. Potots'ka S., Churilov M. *Pershyi «ekzyt-pol» v Ukraini: metodyka i osnovni pryntsyypy organizatsii opytuvannya. Zagal'nonatsional'ni opytuvannya exit poll* [The first exit poll in Ukraine: the methodology and the basic principles of organization of the survey. A nationwide survey exit poll]. Kyiv, Zapovit, 2003, pp. 18–27 [in Ukrainian]

7. Vinoslavskaya S., Churilov N. *Exit poll: metodyka issledovaniya v operativnom rezhyme* [Exit poll: research method for real-time study]. *Sotsiologiya: teoriya, metody, marketing – Sociology: theory, methods, marketing*, 2008, No. 1, pp. 189–196 [in Russian]
8. Rotman D.G. *Elektoral'nye issledovaniya: sushchnost' i tekhnologiya* [Electoral research: nature and technology] *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya – Sociological Studies*, 1998, No. 9, pp. 63–68 [in Russian]
9. Paniotto V., Kharchenko N. *Organizatsiya, metodyka i tekhnologiya opytuvannya* [The organization, methodology and technology of the survey] *Natsional'nyi ekzyt-pol: pozachergovi parlaments'ki vybory '2007*. Kyiv, Tsentr «Demokratychni initsiatyvy», 2007, pp. 18–48 [in Ukrainian]